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Rabbit what are you doing?
I'm going out to kill the elephant. 
Can you really do that?
Well, I'll try... and try again!
- Wasukuma Proverb
Introductory Summary
Over 1975-80 Africa has passed through three main economic periods: 1975- 
79, 1980-84, 1985-89. The first was characterised by the rapid recovery of 
the majority of African economies from 1974 drought/first oil shock 
declines and over 1976-79 by four years of 5% average GDP growth. This was 
in fact the best four years in recorded economic statistics for Africa and 
the only one for which its growth rate was above the South average. In 
retrospect it is clear that this growth was overly dependent on the 
proceeds of the 1985-86 beverage price boom and of oil export earnings, as 
well as on a rapid build-up of external debt. Even at the time, it was 
clear the averages masked very poor performance by several economies 
including Ghana, Zaire and Ethiopia
1980-84 was a period of nearly uniform economic disaster - the only clear- 
cut exceptions being Botswana and Mauritius. The second oil shock, sharp 
increases in world interest rates, general primary product terms of trade 
deterioration, drought and war were among the main causes. These 
interacted with state personnel and financial capacities which had narrow 
margins to handle increased strains and whose efficiency deteriorated 
radically under repeated shocks. Further, over 1980-82 most African 
economies (like the IMF, The World Bank and OECD) assumed rapid global 
growth recovery in 1981/82 or at the latest 82/83 and therefore tried to 
repeat the "riding out the storm" tactics that had served them well over
21974/76. When the external context instead continued to worsen they faced 
the need for more radical cuts in imports and public investment/services 
with much higher external debt than if adjustment had been begun in 
1979/80.
1985-89 has again been more mixed. The 1976-79 5% growth rates of GDP have 
not been regained but the 1.5% to 2% of 1980-84 have been pushed back to 
about a 3% trend - albeit with wide annual, sub-regional and national 
fluctuations. Whether this performance constitutes a base for sustained 
recovery and transformation is unclear. With 1990 GDP/capita 20% to 25% 
below 1980 even recovery has a long way to go and even "successful
adjustors" tend to have 3% to 5% GDP growth imply 2000 to 2020 for
regaining 1980 positions. Clearly adjustment fatigue will force policy 
changes - for better or worse - well before that date.
The 1980s was characterised not simply by slow GDP growth but also by 
increases in the proportion of Africans living in absolute poverty to 30% 
(virtually tied with India for the highest proportion in the world); rising
food insecurity at both household and national levels; decreasing access to
adequate livelihoods (in employment or self-employment); accelerating 
ecological damage (erosion, deforestation, neo-desertification); near 
stagnation in Under 5 mortality rates and life expectancies at birth 
(respectively the highest and lowest of all regions) and, largely as a 
result of impoverishment and insecurity, rising population growth rates.
Brief overviews of Africa must be treated with caution. 52 countries with 
over 500 million people (47 with over 400 million excluding North Africa or 
53 with 650 million including South Africa) are not readily homogenised 
into meaningful averages nor simple qualitative descriptions and analyses. 
As it happens most of the differences are inter country: North African 
performance (and despite higher GDP per capita economic structures) are not 
radically different from middle income Sub-Saharan African economies.
South Africa because of apartheid has a radically different income 
distribution - as well as a more industrially focused structure of 
production. However, its 1980-89 economic performance has been moderately 
worse than that of SSA with rather greater bureaucratic controls and rather 
more self-inflicted damage from luxury consumption and nationally chosen 
high levels of military expenditure.
3More serious SSA data are very bad. Estimates of GDP are rarely better 
than plus or minus 20% and more serious, those of GDP growth are subject to 
plus or minus 2% or more and for population growth up to 1%. At present 
GDP growth is probably marginally underestimated on average (grossly so 
when USA $ conversions are used because of massive post 1983 real 
devaluations in a majority of countries and population growth overestimated 
(e.g. the 1987 Tanzania Census shows a 2.75% population growth rate over 
1977-87 versus the 3.3% estimated from careless comparison of the non­
comparable 1967 and 1977 censi). However, the broad parameters are visible 
despite the uncertainties and the actual position is grim for a majority of 
Africans even if slightly less so than the available data might suggest.
The late 1980s has seen a broadening area of strategic and policy 
agreement. For example, grossly over-valued currencies have few backers 
and neither do short, sharp shock stabilisation schemes with no attention 
to real household income or basic (re-styled human investment) services 
consequences.
The UN Economic Commission for Africa's African Alternative Framework to 
Structural Adjustment Programmes is at least 90% compatible with the World 
Bank's Long Term Perspective Study - From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. 
Reduction of absolute poverty has returned to the World Bank's strategic 
priorities in the 1990 World Development Report and entered the ECA's with 
the Khartoum Human Dimension Conference in 1988 and its Declaration 
subsequently blessed by OAU and ECA summits. There are sharp disagreements 
on phasing, timing, relative priorities and trade-offs but the broad body 
of strategic analysis has moved far away both from the neo-liberalism of 
the Bank's 1981 Berg Report and the Marxian phrased (and less frequently 
substantively intended) neo-mercantilist platforms held by many African 
governments at that date.
It is convenient to look at Africa in 1989/90 and its 1991/2000 prospects 
in a framework of four issue clusters: Public Sector Capacity and 
Governance; Sectoral Bottlenecks; Poverty and External Economic Relations.
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For those African countries afflicted, war, or the live threat of war is 
the greatest single barrier to growth, development or poverty reduction.
In the case of Southern Africa the 1980-88 direct and indirect GDP losses 
from war totalled $65,000 million including Namibia or over twice attained 
GDP (as well as nearly 1,600,000 lives). Since Southern Africa has already 
regained a 3.5% to 4.0% growth trend the potential peace dividend could be 
a 6% annual growth rate.
Only the Southern African costs have been estimated seriously - because 
they flow primarily from external aggression and the main state financer 
and manager of that aggression is South Africa. But the costs of 
interlocking civil, empire breakup (in the classic meaning of empire) and 
border wars to the Horn (Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti) over 
the last decade has probably been in the $20,000-25,000 million range or 
1.3 to 1.7 times actual 1988 GDP and has had (because of famines rendered 
massively fatal by war) a higher death toll than in Southern Africa.
Civil wars in Liberia, Uganda, Zaire; the mixed civil war with external 
manipulation in Chad and the liberation struggle of the Sahara Democratic 
Republic have also crippled the economies affected and had a 
direct/indirect death toll of at least 1,500,000.
War - fought within national boundaries - is the extreme of insecurity.
But law and order in the sense of being able to go about one's daily 
livelihood and life without threat is weak (in varying degrees) in many 
non-war states. The economic costs of weak law and order and of civil 
disorder (whatever its causes) are high. Security is not a sufficient 
condition for development but it is a necessary one.
Governance is usually viewed as a political issue but several aspects are 
economic or have direct economic consequences. First, it is idle to talk 
about good governance if state financial and personnel resources are 
inadequate to the task or poorly deployed. The World Bank's Long Term 
Perspective Study suggests that after eliminating enterprise subsidies and 
concentrating on basic services and infrastructure SSA states will need to 
raise per capita expenditure in real terms 40% to 50% by 2000 - and 
implicitly to raise middle and high level personnel by 25% to 30%. that is 
such a daunting challenge as to require prioritisation away from non-
5essential services and from all but selected crucial public enterprises for 
which private or joint venture alternatives are non-existent or clearly 
unsatisfactory.
Second, accountability requires accounts. African public sector accounts 
usually range from weak to deplorable, especially in providing the interim 
information flows needed within a (government or enterprise) financial year 
for adequate financial management.
Third, participation in governance is likely (by providing data and 
monitoring) to increase efficiency of resource use, morale (and therefore 
productivity) and willingness of communities to augment state resource for 
basic services and small scale infrastructure. Multi partyism is neither a 
sufficient nor a necessary condition - competitiveness of elections, a real 
chance of defeating incumbents and governmental responsiveness to public 
wishes and opinions are crucial.
Sectoral Bottlenecks and Transformation Needs
Macro economic strategy - especially when concentrated on fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policy is not enough. The four most crucial sectors are 
agriculture, transport and communications, manufacturing and energy.
Agriculture remains the key to a majority of African households livelihoods 
and food security as well as a major source of export earnings and 
industrial inputs. Since 1965 its growth has lagged that of population.
The 1980s improvement to 2.5% a year seems to be made up of 2% food (versus 
1.8% in the 1970s and somewhat over 2% in the late 1960s) and 3% 
export/industrial crops (versus negative in the 1970s and over 3% in the 
late 1960s). For sustained recovery and less inadequate nutritional levels 
combined with reduced dependence on food aid 4% is needed annually over 
1990-2010. For export/industrial production 5% is needed to avoid 
continued import strangulation and manufactured blockage albeit on exports 
major shifts, e.g. into horticulture, are needed since for Africa as a 
whole more tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar and perhaps cotton, tobacco and 
oilseed exports would - given African market shares and world price 
elasticities - be likely to reduce, not raise, total net export earnings.
6Most output growth over the past quarter century has come from 
cultivating/grazing more hectarage. In most countries this cannot be 
counted on a continued, let alone a radically enhanced, contribution to 
growth. At the margin farming has pushed into sub-marginal (soil quality 
and/or assured rainfall deficient) areas and pushed pastoralism out into 
even more sub-marginal tracts, The apparent low cultivated to arable land 
ratios are misleading because long rotation "fallow" (under bush or forest) 
land is not vacant given known/viable technologies and can be up to four 
times the area actually cultivated at any one time. A second constraint is 
women's workload - often 14 to 16 hours a day in rural SSA. No more time 
can be put into agriculture unless it can be saved elsewhere.
In the short run major productivity breakthroughs are unlikely - the shelf 
of research/techniques adapted, field tested and cost efficient is very 
poorly stocked. That posits an urgent priority for such research now but 
for late 1990s and 2000s pay off. In the short run better access to 
markets, transport, seeds, hand and animal drawn tools and fertilisers can 
raise output. So can extending the best locally/nationally used techniques 
(often adapted 'traditional' and unknown to the Research Extension
r
establishment) and by freeing women's time for agriculture by improving 
access to basic health services, water and fuel which together can take up 
to 8 hours a day at present.
Transport and communications in SSA have gone backwards since 1979.
Deferred maintenance and war have wrecked many once adequate routes. Other 
rural areas never did have adequate access to transport - nor, therefore, 
to markets. Poor communications internally impede data flow and reduce 
state and enterprise managerial efficiency - again as the result of gaps in 
nominal coverage plus maintenance so long deferred as to lead to endemic 
breakdowns. Externally, telecommunications have improved in the 1980s (as 
has air service) but remain below standards needed for efficient 
participation in global trade.
To regain 1970s basic transport standards, fill the most glaring gaps and 
to attain minimal adequate domestic and external communications will - on 
World Bank estimates - require rapid increases to 2000
investment/maintenance and a build-up of (cost and low income household 
effective but still uncommon) labour intensive rural road-tracks-bridges- 
culverts construction and labour intensive maintenance more generally (as
7now being begun in Mozambique’s urban infrastructure rehabilitation 
project).
Industry in Africa after 7% annual growth in the 1970s and near stagnation 
over the first half of the 1980s has returned to 3% to 4% annual growth.
For 4% to 5% GDP growth and structural transformation at least 6% is 
needed.
Without doubt the unit costs, output trends and structures of the 
industrial sectors of most African economies (Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Mauritius, Tunisia, Algeria and possibly Malawi and Egypt are exceptions) 
are unsound. Why, is a more complex issue varying from country to country, 
industry to industry and plant to plant.
One cause is long deferred maintenance leading to low capacity utilisation 
and high breakdown costs. A second is heavy dependence on borrowed capital 
in a context of high interest rates and - for external borrowings - high 
real devaluation costs. A third is low capacity utilisation not foreseen 
(nor until 1980-82 reasonably foreseeable) as a result of import capacity 
collapse - a factor whose GDP multiplier loss is greater when the direct 
import component is high.
Related to this is low growth of agricultural raw material production 
limiting import substitution and/or capacity utilisation. Fourth is plants 
too large for national markets either from the start or given the 1980s 
collapse of market growth. Fifth are white elephants which either 
initially or with changed world relative prices cannot ever be viable.
Sixth are unit labour costs but here a dichotomy exists. In much of 
Francophone Africa these appear to relate to too high real wages and - 
especially - salaries. But in much of Anglophone and Lusophone Africa the 
reverse is true - real wages and salaries are below the minimum "efficiency 
wage". As a result absenteeism, low morale, disincentive to improve skills 
and theft make lower wages per worker raise labour costs per unit of 
output.
Evidently the appropriate remedies for these causes vary. Only for "white 
elephants" is speedy liquidation unambiguously sound. Nor for the rest is 
instant trade liberalisation - as opposed to phased liberalisation starting 
with inputs and giving time for recuperation (as launched by Zimbabwe in 
1990) - likely to be optimal.
8Three new lines of strategic focus appear appropriate. First, pre-export 
processing and manufacturing (e.g. cocoa paste-powder-butter-oil; sawn 
timber-veneer-plywood-furniture parts; leather-shoe parts-finished leather 
goods). Second, broad market consumer, intermediate, construction and 
simple capital goods. Third, agro-industry broadening demand for domestic 
agricultural products (and increasing rural effective demand for 
manufactures). The second and third categories would usually be helped by 
and often require regional/sub-regional markets. For them to flourish 
economic integration/coordination must go beyond tariff preferences to look 
at knowledge, communications, transport, guidance toward specialisation 
(and away from duplicative surplus capacity). And countries - e.g. Kenya, 
Zimbabwe - must remember that the basic purpose of exports is to secure 
imports and that their SSA markets have not great ability to raise regional 
imports if they have to pay in hard currency. Vigorous sustained trade 
expansion requires attention to identifying potential imports (which can 
include transport, energy and raw materials) and making them actual.
Energy poses two quite different problems. The first is excessive 
dependence on petroleum (in different ways for importers and exporters).
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For importers this points toward increased use of hydroelectric potential 
(not least on a regional basis as is tentatively beginning in Southern 
Africa), coal (when available) and natural gas (found in several states 
with no proved liquid hydrocarbons). For exporters it implies 
diversification - including, but not limited to, natural gas and its 
ammonia/urea product complex and simple petrochemicals and building up 
equalisation reserves in foreign exchange in good years (e.g. 1990/91) to 
cushion adjustment to price collapses as in 1986 and 1988/89.
The other problem - the larger one in terms of energy used and households 
affected directly - is wood fuel. Deforestation is making wood/charcoal 
costlier in cities, increasing rural women's workload to collect it and 
contributing to erosion and neo-desertification. Household and community 
agro-forestry can - over time - reverse this trend, usually by mixing fuel, 
building material, fodder and food providing trees. Pure plantations may 
be suitable for urban fuelling and for pulp mills but are an inappropriate 
technical fix for the ecological-rural household fuel scissors.
9Poverty: Access, Productivity and People
By the most conservative estimates 30% of Sub-Saharan and about 27|% of all 
African (including Northern and South Africa) are absolutely poor as set 
out in the 1990 World Development Report. On the slightly less austere 
basis used in an earlier draft the proportion came to 40%. On either 
definition it is rising; a characteristic unique to Africa (both SSA and 
all Africa) and sharply divergent from Asia including its large low income 
countries.
Nationally absolute poverty ranges from as high as 60% (e.g. Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, probably Malawi) to under 20% (e.g. Mauritius, Seychelles, Cape 
Verde and Botswana). While there is a high negative correlation with war; 
the positive one with output per capita is uneven. States with 
demonstrated policy concern with relative equality or with ensuring minimum 
access to income and services for all citizens, e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Cape Verde, Botswana, Mauritius and Zimbabwe do better on poverty indices 
than GDP per capita would suggest and those with no such applied concern 
(whatever their rhetoric) e.g. Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia, South Africa, Sudan 
and Ethiopia outside the core highland provinces do significantly worse.
The causes of absolute poverty are twofold: lack of access to land, 
employment and/or skills (structural poverty) and lack of rehabilitation 
support and/or safety nets during or after disasters, e.g. drought and war 
at macro level, illness, fire injury or death at household (conjunctural). 
However, in the absence of livelihood rehabilitation, conjunctural poverty 
relatively rapidly becomes structural and permanent for most of those 
afflicted.
While higher output per person is no guarantee of falling absolute poverty; 
falling GDP per capita in low productivity economies is a virtual guarantee 
of rising absolute poverty absolutely and as a proportion of households.
9 The 1980-90 fall of 20% to 25% in average African real GDP is a major cause 
of rising poverty; the return to rising output per person of about half the 
economies in recent years is a sign of hope.
Strategies for reducing absolute poverty rest on four legs: enabling poor 
people to be more productive; achieving universal access to basic services 
(health, education, water, extension); improving basic infrastructure and 
providing safety nets (family, community or state) for those who cannot
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(temporarily or permanently) produce more. This is no longer an area of 
massive disagreement in principle. However, only the basic services and 
infrastructure components are usually well articulated. How to devote 
efforts to raising small farmer micro enterprise and formal or informal 
employee ability to produce is neither well researched nor effectively 
pursued. Safety nets are - except for survival relief backed by food aid - 
sill, on balance fraying, with overload and social change breaking family 
strands faster than new community or state ones can be devised and built 
up.
Food insecurity is an aspect of poverty and of vulnerability to being 
plunged into it. Moderate and severe child malnutrition in Africa ranges 
from 25% to nearly 70% (and severe from 2% to 20%). Food imports have 
risen dramatically to about 6% of all calories (but up to 20% in the most 
serious food deficit cases like Mozambique) and - more crucial - are 
dominantly food aid because with few exceptions massive food deficits 
relate to overall economic disaster not successful specialisation in non­
food products.
Because SSA (indeed Africa) has very limited applicable knowledge on how to 
raise productivity rapidly by technological change, short term measures 
need to focus on input supply, market access and effective mobilisation and 
use of food aid nationally and small farmer enabling, disaster victim 
livelihood rehabilitation and employment (including labour intensive public 
works) augmentation in respect to household food security entitlements from 
production (of food or income exchangeable for it).
Women - especially female-headed households (perhaps 20% of all African 
households) - are disproportionately represented in the absolutely poor and 
food insecure categories. Women's workload in rural areas and low access 
to skills and/or employment to be productive in urban, are major barriers 
to increasing food production and poor urban household incomes. Concern 
about gender divisions of labour, women's exclusion from decisions and * 
unequal access to land-ski11s-employment is not in Africa simply 
egalitarian, humanitarian or - in any narrow sense feminist. It is central 
to reduction of national and household food insecurity and of the numbers 
of households existing in absolute poverty and - in many cases - to 
substantial increases in the rate of growth of production.
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Articulation of action lags the acceptance of the need for it. Data on 
female-headed households - let alone their perceptions of their needs and 
capabilities - is limited; provision of vocational training, of extension 
services and of employment is still often unable (almost literally) to see 
women. However, drives toward universal literacy and basic education and 
health services do benefit women disproportionately because they have had 
the least access to them and because the burden of caring for the sick 
falls primarily on them. Similarly accessible pure water supplies and 
woodfuel save primarily women and girls' time with clear potential both for 
improving child care and for freeing time for production at peak 
agricultural seasons. In many African countries these realities are being 
perceived and acted upon and women's self-organisation for production is 
advancing. While the driving force is frequently women's groups, progress 
is clearly less slow and painful when the state does allocate resources, 
provides an enabling legal framework and seeks to alter traditional 
limiting perceptions on women's roles.
Africa is the most environmentally at risk continent. Deforestation 
(including bushes and shrubs), erosion and neo-desertification are 
advancing at alarming rates with some damaging climatic shifts (e.g. the 
length and intensity of the harmattan on the West African coast) already 
brutally evident. The key cause for most environmental damage is need and 
the worst damagers poor households who must destroy now to survive now even 
thought they know (and care) that their actions limit and endanger their 
and their children’s future livelihoods.
The implications for strategy are clear. Inputs of knowledge, tools and 
fertiliser to enable poor farming households to grow more without damaging 
the land are crucial. Low tillage, inter-cropping and reducing naked soil 
surfaces are examples. Similarly household, co-op and small community tree 
and bush planting based on meeting fuel, building material, fodder and food 
needs can - as demonstrated in a number of Ethiopian and Tanzanian cases - 
achieve rapid support because it demonstrably enhances present livelihoods 
as well as protecting future by erosion control and reduction of neo­
desertification dangers.
But despite some knowledge and successes the environmental battle is still 
being lost. One reason is the rapid expansion of cropping into sub­
marginal, ecologically fragile areas and the consequential pushing of
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livestock raising into even more drought prone and vulnerable ecological 
zones. Both increase food insecurity from crop failure and animal losses 
and both threaten to continue the rising trend of eco-destruction.
Their basic cause is rapid population growth in the absence of parallel 
ability to intensify agriculture and reduce required fallow year ratios. 
African population growth is estimated at around 3% albeit this is probably 
an overestimate (just as pre-1965 estimates were usually underestimates). 
Even if 2.75% is the real rate, it is excessive in respect to ecology, 
resources for providing basic services and women's health.
To date population policy has focused on birth control or - more in line 
with actual African perceptions - birth spacing/family planning. This has 
had some success, especially in middle income countries and among middle 
income groups. It is, however, incomplete. Falling infant mortality, 
rising female literacy, reduced food insecurity and more assured old age 
security (historically and in Africa) are closely associated with birth 
rate declines. Action to promote them (as part of a general drive to 
reduce absolute poverty) would create the conditions in which providing 
access to family planning knowledge and technology would be far more 
desired and effective than it can be today.
The economic impact of AIDS on SSA is clearly serious and growing. In most 
countries between 3% and 20% of the people are probably serio-positive 
(HIV). That percentage is still rising. In several countries' hospitals 
AIDS/AIDS Related Diseases are the largest cause of death for the 15-50 age 
group. Over the 1990s there are likely to be up to 5 million AIDS orphans 
(40% doomed from birth) and 10 million AIDS deaths. The human, household 
economic and social costs are only too evident.
The impact on population and labour force is less clear. Effective action 
against malnutrition and malaria could reduce deaths more than AIDS is 
likely to raise them. How fast practices conducive to HIV transmission are 
changing is unclear as is the future trajectory of infection without such 
changes. So too is the date of development of an effective vaccine.
Visions of more than local depopulation are as unrealistic as those which 
say AIDS is basically northern and of minor concern to Africa.
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External Economic Relationships: Pessimistic Problematic
The world economy since 1960 has - with brief exceptions - evolved in ways 
distinctly unhelpful to Africa. In the 1980s the purchasing power in terms 
of imports of most major African non-oil exports fell by 50% and for oil 
(granted from a high starting point) the slump to mid-1990 was almost as 
great. Many economies have lost up to a tenth of the purchasing power of 
their national product and a third of their import capacity within three 
year periods as a result.
While African exports in physical terms have grown by perhaps 3% a year in 
the 1980s after stagnating or falling in the 1970s, for most this has not 
been enough to offset terms of trade shifts so that earned import capacity 
has fallen.
Because private and commercial capital inflows have over the same period 
gone negative and debt service actually paid risen by 1989 to $17.8 billion 
(23% of $76 billion exports) even the 4% annual real rise of Official 
Development Assistance disbursements and the build-up of massive arrears 
(only about half pre-rescheduling debt service is in fact being paid) has 
averted import cuts for most African economies - of up to 50% for some 
countries in some years. This has brought capacity to invest, maintain and 
operate productive and infrastructural capacity down to levels which in 
several cases can only be termed import capacity strangled.
Worse, there are no clear ways out. Terms of trade for most African 
exports cannot realistically be expected to recover significantly in the 
1990s. For many, world price elasticities are so low that for Africa as a 
whole, larger export volume would mean lower export earnings. This brutal 
fact has been repeatedly underplayed by the World Bank and in the Fraser 
Commission's UNCTAD Report.
To regain sustainable external balance - even with slowly rising ODA flows 
and rescheduling of debt - SSA economies need to develop new exports. In 
general these lie in processing or manufacturing suitable raw materials 
(e.g. logs, hides and skins, cacao beans) before export; exploiting 
potential for new better prospect raw material based exports (e.g. 
horticulture, fertilisers based on natural gas) and selected other 
manufactured products (including capital goods) primarily but not wholly to 
regional markets. In practice neither strategies, data bases nor
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institutions for such an export transformation have been begun in most 
African countries.
External debt now stands at nearly $300 billion (SSA $175 billion, Northern 
Africa $100 billion, RSA $25 billion). If fully serviced it would eat up 
over $30 billion of total exports of somewhat over $80 billion.
Clearly full debt service is an 'alternative' to survival let alone growth. 
The present uneasy compromise of 50% to 60% servicing, 20% to 25% 
rescheduling and 15% to 25% arrears build-up cannot last even if it is less 
damaging than either open default or full payment. At least 50% on average 
(from 0% for Botswana, Libya and Mauritius to near 100% for Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Sudan) is necessary if sustained recovery in African growth 
and growth of industrial economy exports to Africa (especially SSA) is to 
be achieved. In the interim, broader (including all debt de jure or de 
facto), softer (little or no current payment for several years), longer 
(all 1990s payments due in one rescheduling for the most debt distressed), 
would save scarce personnel time and enable coherent forward planning by 
African governments and their external cooperating partners.
Gross PDA to SSA has risen about 4% a year in the 1980s to $15 billion and 
for all Africa to perhaps $22.5 billion. At net level it is of the order 
of $12.5 and $17.5 billion respectively. Within those totals perhaps 30% 
is technical assistance - largely spent on donor personnel - and 20% 
disaster relief.
That ODA has averted worse economic decline in SSA is not really open to 
dispute. Nor indeed is the need for its growth by 50% in the 1990s. But 
its nature and make-up at present are far from optimal. Too much is 
provided and operated by donors on their perceptions of what is needed and 
of setting out to do it without truly channelling through African regional, 
national and local institutions. Too much TA is providing donor nationals 
to do and too little is training Africans (especially in Africa). As a 
result ODA - however intended - often decapacitates creating the need for 
its own continuation rather than contributing to national institutional, 
decision-taking and personnel capacities allowing stabilisation and gradual 
reduction of dependence on ODA.
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Does Africa Have An Economic Future?
The economic record of Africa (SSA, Northern Africa, RSA alike) in the 
1980s has been dismal in respect to growth, external balance, poverty and 
food security. The best that can be said is that most Africans and most 
economies have survived and for a majority of economies (but probably not 
of Africans) the latter half of the 1980s saw a clawing back to 
stabilisation, partial recovery and adjustment and - perhaps - renewed 
growth of output per head.
But it is unreasonable to project the 1980s on for the 1990s. First, over 
1965-1972 and 1976-1979 most African economies were growing economically in 
per capita terms. Second, in the second half of the 1980s many regained 
that position even if tenuously and with great vulnerability to exogenous 
shocks (e.g. the post Iraqi aggression against Kuwait oil price explosion).
But two more factors may be more crucial. On each of the sub-themes 
covered, a growing body of agreement on direction and on practical first 
steps now exists and is being acted on by over half of African States and 
donor agencies. The questions are of articulation, sequence, second steps 
and volume of resources needed with the frequent deadlocks of the 1980s 
apparently increasingly breaking up. Second, in most cases positive 
innovations with promising initial results can be seen, e.g. in security 
nets in Botswana and Mozambique, in small farmer support and enablement via 
IFAD, in effective African based research in Zimbabwe and Kenya nationally, 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference regionally and the 
International Centre for Insect Pathology and Environment continentally; in 
export diversification in Mauritius and Zimbabwe; in imaginative regional 
development coordination by SADCC and the overlapping Preferential Trade 
Area of Eastern and Southern Africa.
The 1990s are not assured to be a decade of renewed economic progress for 
Africa. The positive signs are too partial, tentative and fragile for that 
and the external environment still to uncertain and even menacing.
But peace could raise GDP growth on average; better trade development 
another |%; agricultural and poverty reduction (including enabling women) 
1%; manufacturing and infrastructure rehabilitation and development perhaps 
as much; more accountable, efficient and participatory governance at least 
2 -s; restructuring ODA to enable rather than substitute for African capacity
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at least The total potential gain is 4.0% which if totally realised
(unlikely for all countries) would bring Africa’s growth to 6% to 7% a year 
and on half achievement (quite possible) to 4.5% to 5%. That would not 
create a continent of milk and honey but it would restore a forward dynamic 
and enable most Africans to be better off in 2000 than in 1990.
Perhaps even such tentative optimism is open to doubt. But Africans and 
those committed to working with them have no other option - a rerun of the 
1980s is too terrible to accept as a basis for action. In 1990 it is 
possible to draw some comfort from the oldest recorded piece of European 
African studies; Pliny's 2000 year old warning: "Out of Africa there is 
always something new".
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